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Part II: Judicial Issues
Stranger In A Strange Land:
Biotechnology and the Federal Circuit
Lawrence M. Sung, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit must
engage in many diverse technical disciplines when rising to meet its
legislative mandate of facilitating the nationwide uniformity and the
improved administration of the patent laws.1 Of these fields of study,
biotechnology arguably occasions the most intellectual criticism and
public debate regarding the court’s efforts. In part, such challenges
might reflect moral or ethical concerns over biotechnology patent
protection per se.2 A frustration also appears to exist, however, with
* Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College
(Portland, Oregon). J.D., cum laude, The American University, Washington College of Law
(Washington, DC); Ph.D. Microbiology, United States Department of Defense, Uniformed
Services University of the Health Sciences (Bethesda, Maryland); B.A. Biology, University of
Pennsylvania. Former judicial clerk to the Honorable Raymond C. Clevenger, III, The United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Washington, DC). All inquiries and/or
comments are welcome by telephone at (503) 768-6870, facsimile at (503) 768-6671, or e-mail
at sung@lclark.edu. 
1. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals in civil actions across the
country that arise under the patent statutes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994) (vesting the Federal
Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction in patent appeals from final judgments and orders of the U.S.
district courts and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, from decisions of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, from decisions of
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, and from decisions of the U.S. International Trade
Commission). See also S. REP. NO. 97-275, 2d Sess. 2 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(96 Stat.) 11, 12 (describing the legislative rationale behind the establishment of the Federal
Circuit with the enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,
96 Stat. 25, 37 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295)).
2. See, e.g., Thomas D. Mays, Biotech Incites Outcry, NAT’L L.J., June 22, 1998, at C1
(Rick Weiss, Patent Sought on Making of Part-Human Creatures; Scientist Seeks To Touch off
Ethics Debate, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1998, at A12; Rick Weiss, What Is Patently Offensive?
Policy on ‘Immoral’ Inventions Troubles Legal, Medical Professionals, WASH. POST, May 11,
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the perceived inability of courts, at times, to appreciate adequately
the impact, or lack thereof, of certain biotechnology inventions for
which patent protection has been sought.3
Are the members of the federal judiciary qualified to adjudicate
such technology disputes? In patent cases the legal issues must be
viewed through the eyes of the hypothetical person of ordinary skill
in the art. With respect to biotechnology, the skilled artisan often
holds a Ph.D. and has significant laboratory experience.4 In this
regard, those laypersons charged with the task of resolving
biotechnology disputes would seem somewhat ill-prepared to assume
such an esoteric perspective when applying the patent laws to this
complex subject matter.5
In biotechnology cases, therefore, the casual observer might be
more likely to point out incongruity between the jurisprudence of the
1998, at A21).
3. The Federal Circuit does not stand alone as a target of such public scrutiny. Arguably,
the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) bears the brunt. In recent days the biotechnology
industry, for example, has expressed grave concerns at the proposed guidelines that the PTO
seeks to promulgate for use by its patent examiners to assess an application’s compliance with
various patentability standards. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Examination Guidelines, NAT’L
L.J., Jan. 24, 2000, at B7 (commenting on the reaction to the first proposed written description
examination guidelines published by the PTO in June 1998, and its impact on the second
proposed written description examination guidelines published by the PTO in December 1999).
The issue of the patentability of genetic elements known as expressed sequence tags (ESTs) and
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) has attracted the media spotlight in recent days. See,
e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Lawrence M. Sung & Don J. Pelto,
Greater Predictability May Result in Patent Pools, NAT’L L.J., June 22, 1998, at C2.
4. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 536, 567 (D. Del 1998)) (stating
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that “a person of ordinary skill in the
art would be ‘a junior faculty member with one or two years of relevant experience or a
postdoctoral student with several years of experience’”).
5. At present, only two of the sixteen active and senior judges of the Federal Circuit hold
advanced technical degrees, namely, Circuit Judge Pauline Newman (Ph.D. Chemistry) and
Circuit Judge Alan D. Lourie (Ph.D. Organic Chemistry). In addition, Circuit Judge Arthur J.
Gajarsa and Circuit Judge Richard Linn hold undergraduate degrees in electrical engineering.
However, the court’s human resources also include judicial clerks and the staff of the Office of
the Senior Technical Assistant. In typical years, almost all of these personnel hold technical
undergraduate, if not graduate, degrees that cover a wide range of disciplines. In a superficial
examination, Judge Lourie appears to have authored most of the Federal Circuit opinions in
biotechnology cases, a somewhat disproportionately high amount given the court’s practice of
random panel assignment.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/6
212.doc 08/24/00
2000] Biotechnology and the Federal Circuit 169
Federal Circuit and the underlying scientific realities.6 An ignorance
of the procedural guidelines and substantive legal precedent, to which
the appellate court must remain faithful in rendering its judgments, in
general can only exacerbate the public’s varying degrees of
dissatisfaction over Federal Circuit pronouncements on
biotechnology.7 A more balanced consideration of these contributing
factors might ameliorate the discontent that can accompany the
biotechnology patent opinions of the Federal Circuit. Accordingly,
this Article surveys recent Federal Circuit decisions regarding
biotechnology-related subject matter from the combined perspectives
of science and the law.8
In Part I this Article considers those cases dealing with
biotechnology patents and patent applications that implicate the
statutory conditions for patentability and disclosure requirements.
The issues of utility, obviousness, written description, and
enablement are most important here. Part II discusses inventorship
and priority disputes involving biotechnology inventions. In
particular, it examines the effect of the corroboration requirements on
research and development activities. This Article concludes in Part III
with a review of patent litigation that concerns biotechnology
products and processes. This section focuses on the treatment of
biotechnology inventions in interference proceedings before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and in patent
infringement actions before the federal courts.
6. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Sung, Echoes of Scientific Truth in the Halls of Justice: The
Standards of Review Applied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Patent-
Related Matters, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1233, 1235-36 (1999) (noting scrutiny over the judicial
treatment of technological matters and questions raised by the public about the accuracy of this
treatment from a purely technical perspective).
7. See id. at 1237-38 (discussing the potential misunderstanding of the court’s decisions
in the absence of an appreciation of the degree of deference the Federal Circuit must show to
the findings and conclusions of its lower tribunals on various substantive patent law issues).
8. This Article provides neither an exhaustive consideration of biotechnology patent law
nor a critical jurisprudential analysis of the Federal Circuit patent law decisions addressing
biotechnology. To accommodate an interest in these topics, however, it refers to available
treatises or other published commentaries whenever appropriate. See, e.g., HAROLD C.
WEGNER, PATENT LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY CHEMICALS & PHARMACEUTICALS (2d ed. 1994);
KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (1995).
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I.
Several common misapprehensions come to the forefront with
respect to the decisions of the Federal Circuit in appeals involving
biotechnology inventions. Perhaps the most insidious
misapprehension is the failure to appreciate the existence of a
significant temporal distortion. Absent recognition of the proper
context, the casual observer might understandably conclude that the
court’s biotechnology judgments are senseless, because they rest on
anachronistic notions of the science.
The effective date of the filing of a patent application often
dictates what prior art the invention must overcome to qualify for
patent protection. In addition, the breadth and depth with which
applicants must describe their inventions in patent applications can
depend upon the respective filing dates. The judicial consideration of
the patentability of the subject matter in a patent application or the
validity of an issued patent, therefore, must focus on the state of the
art at the time of the patent application rather than at the time of the
dispute.
The disparity between the filing of the patent application and the
conclusion of the patent infringement lawsuit is perhaps more
pronounced in the field of biotechnology than in the electrical,
mechanical, or even chemical arts. The prosecution of biotechnology
patent applications in the PTO and the litigation of issued
biotechnology patents both commonly exhibit a lengthier duration
than most other types of inventions. In biotechnology matters it is not
uncommon for the Federal Circuit to apply the patent laws to
decades-old science.9
Even forgiving this temporal distortion, however, leaves an
unsatisfactory state of affairs. If a pronouncement by the Federal
Circuit in a biotechnology case can only fairly reflect the proper
application of the patent laws to our primitive understanding of
biotechnology twenty years ago, what meaningful guidance has the
9. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(considering the state of the biotechnology art 16 years earlier); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo
Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (18 years earlier); Kridl v. McCormick, 105
F.3d 1446, 1448, 41 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (18 years earlier).
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court provided for today’s realities, and perhaps more importantly,
for tomorrow’s possibilities? The passage of such time in a rapidly
developing art can witness progress through several next-generation
technologies.10 Accordingly, any reasoned extrapolation of applicable
patent law principles from recently issued court decisions might seem
to border on mere prognostication.11 Of course, any hint of a legal
quandary can create fits among those involved in the costly business
of trying to navigate biotechnology research and development
programs, whether commercial or academic, through patented seas.
An examination of the recent Federal Circuit decisions regarding
biotechnology-related subject matter nevertheless provides a glimpse
of the fundamental patent law principles to which the Federal Circuit
will most likely continue to adhere. The remainder of this section
considers the cases dealing with biotechnology patents and patent
applications that implicate the statutory conditions for patentability
and disclosure requirements.12 In particular, this section discusses the
issues of utility, obviousness, written description and enablement.
A. Utility
To obtain a patent the applicant must demonstrate that the claimed
invention is useful.13 The utility of an invention, in concert with its
novelty and nonobviousness, merits the reward of patent protection.14
Whether a claimed invention lacks utility presents a question of fact,
10. See Lila Feisee, Are Biotechnology Patents Important? Yes!, 1 PTO TODAY 9, 9
(2000) (reporting the PTO perspective that “[b]iotechnology is one of the most research
intensive and innovative industries in the global economy today.”).
11. Of course, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged that in a rapidly advancing science
like biotechnology, “what may be unpredictable at one point in time may become predictable at
a later time.” See Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1374 n.10 (citing In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
12. An issued patent carries a statutory presumption of validity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282
(1994). A party must overcome this presumption by proving invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence of noncompliance with 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 or 112.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
14. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the
benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.”); Cross v. Iizuka, 753
F.2d 1040, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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which the Federal Circuit reviews under the clearly erroneous
standard.15 In any event, an alleged inventive act is not legally
cognizable unless the inventor conceived of the specific utility of the
claimed invention.16
In Kridl v. McCormick the Federal Circuit addressed the utility
requirement in the context of a patent interference proceeding.17 The
court reviewed the determination of the PTO Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences (“Board”), which considered two competing patent
applications that claimed the same, or substantially the same,
biotechnology subject matter.18 The interference count related to the
use of antisense technology to produce plants or plant cells with
resistance to certain viruses.19 Having filed a patent application
before Kridl, McCormick was the first to reduce the invention to
practice, albeit constructively.20 To establish priority of invention,
however, McCormick also needed to prove a date of conception
before that of Kridl.21
McCormick sought to rely upon the dated and witnessed pages of
Marcia Vincent’s laboratory notebook.22 These pages described a
January 1984 experiment in which a gene fragment encoding a viral
protein was inserted into a cloning vector in both the sense and
antisense orientations.23 The Board applied a “rule of reason”
analysis to evaluate this evidence and found that McCormick had
15. See Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
16. See Rey-Bellet v. Engelhardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (stating that
“conception of [an] . . . invention is not complete absent a conception of its utility.”).
17. 105 F.3d 1446, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The PTO may declare an interference where a
patent application claims the same, or substantially the same, subject matter as another
application or as an unexpired patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1994). In this proceeding the PTO
determines which party has priority of invention, or in other words, who was the first to invent.
Because the first to invent is the only true inventor entitled to patent protection, the outcome of
an interference proceeding typically leaves the winner with a patent and the loser without a
patent.
18. Kridl, 105 F.3d at 1448 (reporting the interference declared between a patent
application assigned to Agracetus, Inc., and another assigned to Calgene, Inc.).
19. Id. An interference count establishes the scope of the interference by defining the
invention common to the parties. The interpretation of an interference count is analogous to
claim construction.
20. Id. at 1449.
21. Id.
22. See Kridl, 105 F.3d at 1448.
23. Id. at 1448-49.
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conceived of the invention before Kridl.24 The Board thus awarded
priority of invention to McCormick.25
In reaching its decision the Board also concluded that McCormick
conceived of the utility of the claimed invention in January 1984.26
The Board did so based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of
one of the inventors, Dr. William Swain.27 Kridl contended that
antisense had more than one substantial use, and thus McCormick
might have used it for a different purpose in January 1984.28
According to Kridl, McCormick could have used antisense as an
experimental control or as a mere template for the production of
recombinant DNA in the sense orientation.29
The Federal Circuit considered the state of the biotechnology art
in 1984 to refute Kridl’s arguments and affirm the Board’s
determination.30 There was no dispute that the use of antisense in
plants was not known in 1984.31 The Federal Circuit thus reasoned
that it would have been illogical for McCormick to use such novel
material as an experimental control, which usually involves tried and
true compounds.32 In addition, because sense constructs could be
produced at that time by more established methods, the Federal
Circuit stated that it would have been wasteful for anyone to use
antisense to generate recombinant DNA in the sense orientation.33
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that one skilled in the
art in 1984 would have seen no substantial use for the antisense
constructs described in Ms. Vincent’s laboratory notebook other than
as “a means for imparting viral resistance to plants or plant cells.”34
24. Id. at 1449. See also Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted) (“A ‘rule of reason’ analysis is applied to determine whether the inventor’s prior
conception testimony has been corroborated. . .. An evaluation of all pertinent evidence must be
made so that a sound determination of the credibility of the inventor’s story may be reached.”)
(emphasis added).
25. Kridl, 105 F.3d at 1449.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1448-49.
28. Id. at 1450.
29. Id.
30. See Kridl, 105 F.3d at 1450.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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The court stated that under a rule of reason analysis explicit
corroboration of the inventor’s recognition of utility might not always
be necessary.35 For example, in certain situations utility might be
implicit in the evidence presented.36
B. Obviousness
To receive patent protection an invention must be nonobvious at
the time of the invention to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art.37
Nonobviousness is a question of law that the Federal Circuit reviews
de novo.38 The conclusion of nonobviousness, however, is subject to
underlying factual findings, which the Federal Circuit reviews for
clear error.39 These facts include the scope and content of the prior
art, the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention,
objective evidence of nonobviousness, and differences between the
prior art and the claimed invention.40 Certain secondary
considerations might also be pertinent, and include “commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failures of others.”41
During patent prosecution the examiner bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of obviousness.42 When the references
cited by the patent examiner fail to establish such a case of
obviousness, the rejection is improper and will be overturned.43 Once
the patent examiner meets this initial burden, however, the burden
shifts to the applicant to provide rebuttal evidence to overcome the
rejection.44
35. See Kridl, 105 F.3d, at 1451.
36. Id.
37. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (defining conditions for patentability, including
nonobvious subject matter).
38. See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
39. See In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also In re Beattie, 974
F.2d 1309, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing what the prior art teaches as a question of fact,
which is reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard).
40. See Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GMBH, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
41. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
42. See In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.3d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir 1992)).
43. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
44. See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692-93 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“Such rebuttal or
argument can consist of . . . any other argument or presentation of evidence that is pertinent.”).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/6
212.doc 08/24/00
2000] Biotechnology and the Federal Circuit 175
The Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the Board, which
upheld the patent examiner’s final rejection of the claims as
obvious.45 The subject matter of the patent application in Deuel
involved DNA encoding heparin-binding growth factor (“HBGF”) of
bovine and human origins.46 Deuel achieved the claimed invention by
first isolating bovine uterine HBGF protein and determining the
amino acid sequence of a small beginning portion of the protein.47
Next, Deuel chemically synthesized a single strand of DNA, known
as an oligonucleotide, corresponding to this short amino acid
sequence.48 Using this oligonucleotide, Deuel isolated the naturally
occurring bovine HBGF gene from a collection of DNAs, referred to
as a cDNA library, encoding bovine uterine proteins in general.49
Deuel then determined the entire nucleotide sequence of the bovine
uterine HBGF gene and predicted the amino acid sequence of the
remaining unknown portion of the bovine uterine HBGF protein.50
These bovine sequences constituted part of the claimed invention.51
In addition, Deuel used the oligonucleotide to isolate the naturally
occurring human HBGF gene from the human placental cDNA
library.52 Similarly, Deuel then determined the entire nucleotide
sequence of the human placental HBGF gene and predicted the amino
acid sequence of the complete human placental HBGF protein.53
These human sequences also constituted part of the claimed
invention.54
The patent examiner asserted that the claimed invention would
have been prima facie obvious in view of the prior art.55 The prior art
upon which the examiner relied included a Maniatis reference
describing gene cloning methods and a Bohlen reference disclosing
45. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1553-54 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev’g Ex parte Deuel, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d 1445 (Bd. Pat. App. Int. 1993).
46. Id. at 1553-54 (referring to U.S. patent application Serial No. 07/542,232).
47. Id. at 1555.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1555.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1555-56.
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the partial amino acid sequences of proteins composing a subclass of
human and bovine HBGF.56 The examiner maintained that Bohlen
would have motivated one skilled in the art to clone the respective
human and bovine HBGF genes as taught by Maniatis to produce
human and bovine HBGF protein.57
In rebuttal, Deuel contended that the prior art “taught away” from
the claimed invention; that is, Bohlen suggested that one skilled in
the art would not have been motivated to use the same
oligonucleotide to isolate the genes for human and bovine HBGF, as
Deuel ultimately did.58 The examiner rejected Deuel’s teaching away
argument, however, relying on the unfounded notion that HBGF
genes may be homologous across species.59 The Board upheld the
examiner’s rejection, focusing instead on the allegedly routine nature
of cloning.60
In reversing the rejection of Deuel’s claims, the Federal Circuit
relied on precedent stating that, absent prior art suggesting the
specific claimed DNA, a particular DNA sequence is not obvious
simply because the prior art discloses general methods for isolating
DNA.61 The court further applied precedent regarding chemical
inventions, which stated that the prior art disclosure of a broad genus
does not necessarily render obvious a specific compound within the
genus.62 Because many different DNA sequences can encode the
identical protein, the court concluded that the simple disclosure of the
protein does not render any particular one of those DNA sequences
obvious, absent prior art specifically pointing one out.63 The Federal
Circuit also discounted the Board’s contentions regarding the routine
nature of Deuel’s work as mere speculation and “impermissible
hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention.”64
Two years later in 1997, the Federal Circuit reached the opposite
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1556.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1556-57.
61. Id. at 1558-59 (reaffirming In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
62. Id. (citing with approval In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1558.
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conclusion on the obviousness issue with respect to another
biotechnology invention. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s
decision with In re Mayne,65 which upheld the patent examiner’s final
rejection of claims to proteins produced by recombinant genetic
technology.66 Specifically, the patent application claimed proteins
comprising the amino acid methionine connected to an enterokinase
cleavage site and coupled to either human growth hormone (hGH) or
bovine growth hormone (bGH).67
The Federal Circuit held that the PTO met its burden of
establishing a prima facie case of obviousness.68 The compounds,
hGH and bGH, were well known.69 In addition, the prior art taught
the use of fusion proteins and identified possible cleavage sites for
enterokinase.70 The claimed invention recited a hGH or bGH fusion
protein, including a region containing enterokinase cleavage site, that
was structurally similar and functionally equivalent to that taught in
the cited prior art references.71 Moreover, the references suggested
the interchangeability of these amino acid substitutions.72
Having the burden of providing rebuttal evidence to overcome the
patent examiner’s rejection, Mayne attempted to show that the
“claimed fusion proteins possess an unexpected property over the
prior art.”73 Mayne argued that both the low immune response
induced after intravenous administration and the biological activity of
the protein before cleavage of the initial peptide chain were
surprising results.74 However, the Federal Circuit discounted the
evidence submitted in support of these assertions.75 The absence in
the patent specification of comparative data or any explanation of the
significance of the data appeared fatal.76
65. 104 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
66. Id. at 1340.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1343.
69. Id. at 1342.
70. In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
71. Id. at 1342-43.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1343 (citing In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
74. Id.
75. In re Mayne, 104 F.3d at 1343-44.
76. Id. at 1344.
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C. Written Description
To obtain patent protection an inventor must set forth an adequate
written description of the invention.77 To comply with the written
description requirement, a patent must describe an invention in
sufficient detail that one skilled in the art could clearly conclude that
the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter.78 As it
pertains to biotechnology inventions, an adequate written description
of nucleic acids, such as DNA or RNA, requires a precise definition,
including the pertinent “structure, formula, chemical name, or
physical properties.”79 A mere statement that a nucleic acid is part of
the invention and “a reference to a potential method for isolating it,”
will not suffice.80 The adequacy of a written description is a question
of fact that the Federal Circuit reviews for clear error.81
The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision with In re
Brana, which upheld the patent examiner’s final rejection of the
claims of the application for failure to satisfy the requirements of the
first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.82 The subject matter of the
application involved pharmaceutical compositions having antitumor
activity in humans.83 In the final office action the examiner rejected
the claims of the application, because the specification failed to (1)
disclose a “specific disease against which the claimed compounds
were active” and (2) “establish a reasonable expectation that the
claimed compounds had a practical utility.”84 The Board upheld the
patent examiner’s rejection under the first paragraph of § 112 but
stated that a rejection under § 101 would likewise have been proper.85
Regarding the examiner’s first ground for rejection, the Federal
Circuit noted that the applicants tested the claimed compounds on
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
78. See Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re
Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262
(C.C.P.A. 1976)).
79. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
80. See id. at 1170.
81. See Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
82. 51 F.3d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
83. Id. at 1562 (reporting the U.S. patent application at issue as Serial No. 533,944).
84. Id. at 1563-64.
85. Id. at 1564.
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tumor cell lines derived from animals suffering from lymphocytic
leukemias.86 The court thus concluded that the disclosed ameliorative
activity of the claimed compounds on tumor cells constitutes a proper
allegation of sufficiently specific use.87 As for the second ground for
rejection, the Federal Circuit held that the patent examiner failed to
satisfy “the initial burden of challenging a presumptively correct
assertion of utility in the disclosure.”88 The court noted that the prior
art references upon which the Board relied did not “question the
usefulness of any [related] compound as an antitumor agent.”89
Moreover, one of the references disclosed compounds structurally
similar to those of the claimed invention, possessing proven in vivo
effectiveness as chemotherapeutics against various types of tumors.90
The Federal Circuit determined that even if the PTO satisfied its
initial burden, the applicants provided evidence of statistically
significant animal tests sufficient to convince one skilled in the art of
the inventions’ asserted utility.91 To require in vivo human testing
akin to Phase II clinical studies conducted by the Food and Drug
Administration would place a higher standard for the first paragraph
of § 112, compliance on applicants seeking patent protection for
pharmaceuticals for humans.92
In In re Alton,93 the Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision,
which upheld the patent examiner’s final rejection of the claims of
the application for failure to provide an adequate written
description.94 The Federal Circuit did not decide whether or not the
specification contained an adequate written description.95 However,
the court held that the patent examiner and the Board erred in
dismissing a declaration submitted by the applicants concerning what
86. In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1565.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1566.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1567-68.
92. Id. at 1568.
93. 76 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
94. Id. at 1170.
95. Id. at 1174 (citing Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (“We express
no opinion on the factual question of whether the specification adequately describes the subject
matter of claim 70”).
Washington University Open Scholarship
212.doc 08/24/00
180 Re-Engineering Patent Law [Vol. 2:167
one skilled in the art would have known when the patent application
was filed.96
The claimed technology related to an analog of human gamma
interferon (IFN-g).97 The patent specification contained twelve
examples of IFN-g analogs, but none was identical to the claimed
IFN-g analog.98 The closest example, example five, recited an
asparagine as the eighty-first amino acid in an IFN-g polypeptide
sequence, whereas the claimed analog contained a lysine at that
position.99 The patent examiner noted this difference, stating that
despite its similarity to the claimed analog, example five did not
“constitute a description of the claimed analog.”100
In response, the applicants offered the declaration of Randolph
Wall as evidence of what one of ordinary skill in the art would have
known in 1983.101 Dr. Wall testified that the skilled artisan would
have understood the asparagine-lysine difference as insignificant
because the main thrust of the invention, as described in the
specification, was the deletion of the first three amino acids of natural
IFN-g to achieve the claimed analog.102 In other words, according to
Dr. Wall, the skilled artisan would have interpreted example five to
describe the claimed analog as well, given the irrelevance of the
asparagine-lysine difference.103 The patent examiner dismissed this
declaration as merely an opinion stating a legal conclusion.104
The Federal Circuit did not address whether or not Dr. Wall was
correct.105 Instead, the court vacated the Board’s decision on the
ground that the patent examiner should not have refused to consider
the substance of Dr. Wall’s declaration.106 The Federal Circuit held
that the declaration, although couched in opinion terms, provided
96. Id. at 1176.
97. Id. at 1170 (describing the claimed subject matter of U.S. patent application Serial No.
06/483,451).
98. Id. at 1171.
99. In re Alton, 76 F.3d at 1171.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1172.
102. Id. at 1173.
103. Id.
104. In re Alton, 76 F.3d at 1173-74.
105. Id. at 1174.
106. Id. at 1176.
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factual bases attempting to explain why one of ordinary skill in the
art would construe example five to also cover the claimed IFN-g.107
In Regents of University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that the asserted
patent claims were invalid, because the patent failed to provide an
adequate written description of the claimed subject matter.108 The
patented technology involved human insulin produced by
recombinant DNA methods.109 The patent claims concerned the use
of human insulin cDNA, but the specification provided a written
description only regarding rat insulin cDNA.110 Although the patent
recited a general method for obtaining human cDNA along with the
amino acid sequences for human insulin, the Federal Circuit noted
that enablement was not the issue.111 This disclosure provided no
structural information or physical characteristics, such as a nucleotide
sequence, of any of the human cDNAs in the claimed genus.112
Absent such identification, the generic references to vertebrate or
mammalian insulin cDNA were inadequate written descriptions,
which could not distinguish the claimed genus from others, except by
function.113 The Federal Circuit stated that a proper written
description of a cDNA genus, for example, might be the nucleotide
sequences of a representative number of cDNAs or the recitation of
structural features common to the members of the genus.114 Without
more, generic references indicate only what one might achieve and
provide no information about the resulting claimed material.115
In Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, Inc., the Federal Circuit
considered a case presenting a written description question but did
not decide the issue of compliance.116 The claims of U.S. Patent No.
4,965,204 encompassed a broad genus of monoclonal antibodies that
could bind specifically to antigens expressed on the surface of
107. Id.
108. 119 F.3d 1559, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
109. Id. (identifying the patents-in-suit as U.S. Patents No. 4,652,525 and No. 4,431,740).
110. Id. at 1562-63.
111. Id. at 1567.
112. Regents of Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1567.
113. Id. at 1567-68.
114. Id. at 1568-69.
115. Id. at 1568.
116. 152 F.3d 1342, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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immature stem cells but not on the surface of mature cells.117 The
patent disclosed only one monoclonal antibody, anti-My-10, as an
embodiment of the claimed invention.118
On appeal CellPro contended that an application of the Federal
Circuit’s holding in Lilly required the conclusion that the ‘204 patent
lacked adequate written description to support its claims.119 In Lilly
the Federal Circuit ruled that claims to a genus of vertebrate or
mammalian insulin cDNA were unsupported by the patent
specification’s disclosure of a single species of rat insulin cDNA.120
CellPro sought to argue by analogy that the disclosure of anti-My-10
in the ‘204 patent did not provide adequate written description to
support its claims to a broad genus of monoclonal antibodies.121 The
Federal Circuit, however, never reached the merits of CellPro’s Lilly
argument, which the court admonished as having been raised
seriously for the first time only on appeal.122
D. Enablement
To obtain a patent the applicant must provide a sufficient
disclosure to enable any person skilled in the art to practice the
invention.123 The patent specification must teach those skilled in the
art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention
without undue experimentation.124 A party seeking to invalidate a
patent based on a lack of enablement must prove such by clear and
convincing evidence.125 Enablement is a question of law that the
Federal Circuit reviews de novo.126 The Federal Circuit reviews the
117. Id. at 1347.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1361.
120. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d at 1361; Regents of Univ. of
California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1568.
121. 152 F.3d at 1361.
122. Id. at 1362 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); Braun, Inc. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
123. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
124. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(specifying that no amount of experimentation is preclusive if merely routine in nature).
125. See Morton Int’l Co. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
126. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus., Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (citing In re
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (Fed. Cir. 1996) (providing the court’s standard of
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underlying facts found by a lower tribunal for clear error.127
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc.,128 the Federal Circuit
considered whether patent claims to use antisense nucleic acids to
regulate gene expression in prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells broadly
were invalid.129 The patents provided working examples limited to
only one prokaryote, Escherichia coli.130 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the district court that the patent claims were
invalid for failure to satisfy the enablement requirement of the first
paragraph of § 112.131
In this case the patented technology related to regulation of gene
expression through antisense nucleic acid.132 For example, the
incorporation of antisense technology in the accused Calgene
FLAVR SAVR tomato permitted better control of when the fruit
ripens.133 Specifically, the product relied upon antisense nucleic acid
to block the expression of the polygalacturonase gene, which encodes
an enzyme that promotes the ripening of tomatoes.134
Following a bench trial, the district court ruled that Calgene did
not infringe the asserted claims of the Enzo patents and that, in any
event, those patent claims were invalid.135 With respect to the
invalidity determination, the district court held that undue
experimentation would have been “necessary to practice antisense
review on the enablement issue); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing
Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
127. See Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1077 (citing Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d
1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Dupont De
Nemowis & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
128. 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
129. Id. at 1372. The court noted that the critical date for the enablement inquiry is the date
that the patent application was filed, which was the same for both patents-in-suit, namely,
October 20, 1983. Id. at 1371.
130. Id. at 1367-68 (teaching the application of the patented technology to the lpp
(lipoprotein), ompC (outer membrane protein C), and ompA (outer membrane protein A) genes
of E. coli).
131. Id. at 1371.
132. Id. at 1366-67 n.4 (providing a working knowledge of antisense technology and
recognizing that no universally accepted mechanism of action for gene expression regulation by
antisense exists).
133. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1368.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1365 (identifying the patents-in-suit as U.S. Patents No. 5,190,931, and No.
5,208,149).
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technology in cells other than E. coli.”136 The Federal Circuit
concluded that the district court did not clearly err in its findings on
this issue.137
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s assessment
that, in 1983, antisense was a highly unpredictable technology.138 In
addition, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the extensive amount of
experimentation required to adapt antisense technology to cells other
than E. coli.139 Perhaps the clearest examples of this were the
numerous instances of the inventor’s own failed attempts to achieve
antisense regulation of the expression of other prokaryotic or
eukaryotic genes.140 The Federal Circuit rejected Enzo’s assertions
that these failed attempts should be disregarded because the inventor
did not possess the appropriate level of skill in the relevant field,
namely, genetic engineering.141
In view of the absence of guidance, direction, working examples
of antisense in eukaryotes, or even any prokaryote other than E. coli,
the Federal Circuit held that the patent provided no more than a plan
or invitation to practice antisense in those cells.142 Such minimal
disclosure was insufficient to support the broad scope of the patent
claims.143
In Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, the Federal Circuit
vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction enjoining Novo
from importing, marketing, using, selling, offering for sale, or
distributing its Norditropin® brand recombinant human growth
hormone (hGH) product.144 Initially, Genentech had sued Novo for
patent infringement.145 The district court ruled that Genentech would
likely overcome Novo’s defense that Genentech’s patent was invalid
for lack of enablement.146 The Federal Circuit held that the district
136. Id. at 1369.
137. Id. at 1372.
138. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d at 1368.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1372-73.
141. Id. at 1373.
142. Id. at 1374-75.
143. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc. 188 F.3d at 1375.
144. 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
145. Id. at 1363.
146. Id.
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court erred in reaching this conclusion and thus abused its discretion
in granting Genentech’s preliminary injunction motion.147
The patent claims were directed to a process for cleavable fusion
expression.148 This methodology involved the expression of DNA
encoding a conjugate protein, and the use of an enzyme to cleave off
the undesired portion of the correspondingly produced protein.149
Novo argued that Genentech’s patent was invalid because it failed to
provide a disclosure commensurate with the scope of its claims.150
Specifically, Novo pointed to the paucity of teaching, which included
only statements about the possibility of cleavable fusion expression,
the DNA sequence of hGH, the use of a single enzyme (trypsin) for
cleaving undisclosed conjugate proteins, and the possibility of amino
acid extensions conjugated to hGH as enzyme cleavage sites.151
The Federal Circuit agreed with Novo.152 The court noted that the
patent provided no description of any specific cleavable conjugate
proteins or any reaction conditions under which cleavable fusion
expression would work, with hGH or otherwise.153 The patent merely
described several applications for which cleavable fusion expression
is generally well suited, and identified trypsin and its cleavage
sites.154 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the limited
disclosure constituted the “mere germ of an idea,” which would not
have enabled a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of patent
application filing to use cleavable fusion expression to make hGH
without undue experimentation.155
In reaching this conclusion the Federal Circuit discounted the
testimony offered by Genentech that one skilled in the art would have
had sufficient knowledge to determine all the missing information
and thus to achieve the claimed invention.156 The court deemed the
147. Id. at 1362-63.
148. Id. at 1363 (indicating the patent-in-suit as U.S. Patent No. 5,424,199).
149. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d at 1363.
150. Id. at 1364.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1366.
153. Id. at 1365.
154. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d at 1365.
155. Id. at 1366.
156. Id.
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evidence irrelevant.157 Indeed, the Federal Circuit stated that the
patent specification was “so lacking . . . that providing testimony
regarding the skill in the art has been an exercise in futility.”158
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit reasoned that despite the
motivation in the art to do so, no one was able to produce any human
protein by use of the cleavage fusion expression method at the time
of patent application filing, and for nearly a year afterwards.159 From
this consideration, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the claimed
invention was “an application of an unpredictable technology in the
early stages of development.”160 In such circumstances, an even
higher judicial vigilance to the issue of compliance with the
enablement requirement might be warranted.161
In Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Johns
Hopkins that the claims of U.S. Patent No. 4,965,204 were not
invalid for lack of enablement.162 The patented technology related to
monoclonal antibodies specific for antigens expressed on the surface
of immature stem cells, but not on the surface of mature cells.163
These antibodies could be used in cell separation methods to prepare
enriched stem cell populations that are substantially free of mature
myeloid and lymphoid cells.164 The absence of mature cells would
help minimize the risk of a potentially fatal condition known as Graft
Versus Host Disease that can occur during bone marrow
transplants.165
The claims of the ‘204 patent encompassed a broad genus of
monoclonal antibodies that could bind specifically to “an antigen on
nonmalignant, immature human marrow cells, wherein said antigen is
stage specific and not lineage dependent, and said antigen is also
specifically bound by the antibody produced by the hybridoma
157. Id. at 1366-67.
158. Id. at 1367.
159. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d at 1367.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1368.
162. 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
163. Id. at 1347.
164. Id. at 1347 & n.4 (describing fluorescence-activated cell, or coating, separation).
165. Id. at 1346.
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deposited under ATCC Accession No. HB-8483.”166 The recited
antigen would be recognizable by those skilled in the art as the CD34
antigen, which was a designation that arose in custom after the filing
of the patent application.167 The ‘204 patent disclosed one
monoclonal antibody, anti-My-10, as an embodiment of the claimed
invention.168 The parties did not dispute that anti-My-10, as well as
the accused CellPro 12.8 antibody, would bind specifically to the
CD34 antigen.169
CellPro charged that the ‘204 patent violated the first paragraph of
§ 112, because the disclosure of anti-My-10 was insufficient to
enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use other
antibodies within the claimed genus without undue
experimentation.170 To establish lack of enablement CellPro carried
the burden of proof at trial by clear and convincing evidence.171 The
district court, however, concluded that the evidence upon which
CellPro relied in opposition to Johns Hopkins’ summary judgment
motion did not raise a genuine issue of material fact necessary to
avoid judgment against CellPro on the enablement issue as a matter
of law.172 The Federal Circuit agreed, even when the court properly
viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to CellPro as the
nonmoving party.173
The record showed that the method disclosed in ‘204 patent was
used by others to produce over forty additional CD34 antibodies.174
Moreover, the preferred immunogen, namely the KG-1a cell line,
described in the patent for producing the claimed monoclonal
antibodies was the same as CellPro used to make its accused 12.8
antibody.175 This notwithstanding, CellPro pointed to instances of
alleged failures to obtain an anti-CD34 antibody after following the
166. Johns Hopkins Univ. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis removed) (reciting
claim 1 of the ‘204 patent).
167. Id. at 1350 & n.13.
168. Id. at 1347.
169. Id. at 1350-51 & n.13.
170. Id. at 1351.
171. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d at 1359.
172. Id. at 1361.
173. Id. at 1359.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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disclosed method.176
After scrutinizing CellPro’s evidence the Federal Circuit
concluded that the inability of the inventor’s own laboratory to
produce another anti-CD34 antibody according to the method
disclosed in the patent was of no moment.177 In particular, the Federal
Circuit noted that these specific laboratory personnel were
undergraduate students with no previous experience in monoclonal
antibody production.178 The Federal Circuit held that CellPro failed to
establish that anyone of ordinary skill in the art had failed to create an
anti-CD34 antibody in the described fashion.179
Perhaps most importantly, the Federal Circuit discounted the
testimony of CellPro’s experts, which the court found to lack the
required nexus between failure or difficulty in achieving the claimed
antibodies and the method described in the ‘204 patent.180 One expert
indicated that he did not use the screening technique disclosed in the
patent specification.181 Another expert admitted that he did not
attribute his problems to any shortcoming in the disclosure, but
instead to the probabilistic nature of antibody production generally.182
On this point, the Federal Circuit reiterated that if it is merely routine,
even a considerable amount of experimentation is not undue.183
II.
The legal status of inventorship rests upon the core tenet that
“[c]onception is the touchstone of inventorship.”184 From the earliest
cases courts have uniformly held that an inventor is a person who
conceived the patented invention.185 However, the relatively static
176. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d at 1360.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc. 152 F.3d at 1360.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (citing Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
185. See Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 530, 563-64 (1874). Indeed, one need
not personally reduce to practice his or her complete conception to remain an inventor. Acts by
others in certain circumstances can inure to the inventor’s benefit. See Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154
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nature of the patent law principles underlying inventorship belies the
long-standing discontent with their practical application.186
The legal standard of conception can be thought of as the
“formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent
idea of the complete and operative invention.”187 The courts have
further explained that an idea is sufficiently “definite and permanent”
when “only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention
to practice, without extensive research or experimentation.”188 Of the
positive indicia of inventorship, the ability to articulate the inventive
concept is an important starting point.189 “Invention” and
“inventorship” are often at the heart of patent interference
proceedings before the PTO to determine priority, i.e., who invented
first.
In Barton v. Adang the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s entry
of judgment against Barton in a three party interference.190 The PTO
declared an interference between the Barton patent application, the
F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“In order to establish inurement, an inventor must show,
among other things, that the other person was working either explicitly or implicitly at the
inventor’s request. . .. While derivation focuses on the communication of information between
two parties, inurement focuses on the nature of the relationship between them. Communication
of the conception by the inventor to the other party is not required to establish inurement.”
(internal citations omitted)).
186. See, e.g., Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 1372-73 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), aff’d mem., 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973) (The exact parameters of what constitutes
joint inventorship are quite difficult to define. It is one of the muddiest concepts in the muddy
metaphysics of the patent law.”). Id. at 1372.
187. See Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (quoting 1 ROBINSON ON PATENTS 532 (1890) Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
188. See id.
189. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
[T]he test for conception is whether the inventor had an idea that was definite and
permanent enough that one skilled in the art could understand the invention; the
inventor must prove his conception by corroborating evidence, preferably by showing
a contemporaneous disclosure. An idea is definite and permanent when the inventor
has a specific, settled idea, a particular solution to the problem at hand, not just a
general goal or research plan he hopes to pursue. . . . The conception analysis
necessarily turns on the inventor’s ability to describe his invention with particularity.
Until he can do so, he cannot prove possession of the complete mental picture of the
invention.
Id. (citations omitted). These rules ensure that patent rights attach only when an idea is so far
developed that the inventor can point to a definite, particular invention.
190. 162 F.3d 1140, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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Fischoff patent application, and the Adang issued patent. The
respective assignees of the issued patent were Agracetus, Monsanto,
and Mycogen Plant Science, Inc.191 The patent applications and
patent claimed methods for expression in plants of Bacillus
thuringiensis genes encoding insecticidal proteins.192
Shortly after the declaration of the interference, Monsanto bought
Agracetus, which eliminated the adversity between the Barton and
Fischoff patent applications.193 When it notified the PTO of this
ownership change, Monsanto asserted that good cause existed for the
continuation of the interference because the content of the count had
not been firmly established.194 Furthermore, Monsanto contended that
the complexities of the priority determination in biotechnology cases
“made it impossible for Monsanto to choose the best application with
which to defend the interference.”195
The Board issued a show cause order why judgment should not be
entered against Monsanto given the commonly owned applications.196
Monsanto responded that the indefiniteness of the count precluded a
rational election between the applications.197 When the Board issued
an order that Monsanto had not shown good cause to continue the
interference, Monsanto elected to proceed with the Fischoff
application and moved to have judgment entered immediately against
the Barton application.198 The Board granted this motion and
Monsanto appealed the original order.199
The Federal Circuit held that at the stage of the proceedings when
the Board issued its show cause order, “Monsanto could not
determine which application . . . would be the best evidence to
establish priority” of invention to defeat the Adang patent.200 If the
191. Id. (identifying the patent applications and patent at issue as U.S. patent applications
Serial No. 07/827,906 (Barton), No. 08/434,105 (Fischoff), and U.S. Patent No. 5,380,831
(Adang)).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1142.
194. Barton v. Adang, 162 F.3d at 1142 (noting that “the precise content of the count in an
interference is subject to change following preliminary motions”).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1143.
199. Barton v. Adang, 162 F.3d at 1143.
200. Id.
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final interference count excluded subject matter disclosed in the
Barton application but not the Fischoff application, Monsanto would
lose patentable subject matter by the early dismissal of the Barton
application.201 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to
the Board to continue the interference on both its applications until
the Board decided the preliminary motions to finalize the count and
the parties completed discovery.202
In Schendel v. Curtis the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s
summary judgment awarding priority of invention to Curtis in a
patent interference proceeding.203 The subject matter of the
interference count involved a fusion protein of interleukin-3 (IL-3)
and a hematopoietin, which could be granulocyte colony stimulating
factor (G-CSF) or granulocyte-macrophage colony stimulating factor
(GM-CSF).204 Schendel alleged priority of invention based on his
alleged “actual reduction to practice of an IL-3/G-CSF fusion
protein” before Curtis’ effective patent application filing date.205
The Federal Circuit upheld the Board’s ruling that Schendel’s
evidence failed to show that he obtained an IL-3/G-CSF fusion
protein.206 Although the scientific evidence and declarations
apparently indicated that Schendel had isolated material having the
respective biological activities of IL-3 and G-CSF, there was no
showing that this material constituted an actual fusion protein.207 In
particular, the absence of any chemical composition or structural
data, such as a relatively simple molecular weight determination,
appeared significant to the ultimate resolution of this case.208
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 83 F.3d 1399, 1400-02  (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reporting the interference declared between
U.S. patent application Serial No. 08/057,198 and U.S. Patent No. 5,073,627).
204. Id. at 1400 & n.3.
205. Id. at 1401.
206. Id. at 1404.
207. Schendel v. Curtis, 83 F.3d at 1404.
208. Id. (“[W]ithout any molecular weight or other probative data relevant to the
composition or structure of the molecule he allegedly prepared, there is insufficient evidentiary
support for Schendel’s conclusory assertion that he made . . . [a] fusion protein.”).
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III.
Patent infringement liability arises with the unauthorized
manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale in the United States of a
patented invention, or the importation of that invention into the
United States.209 The determination of infringement is a two-step
inquiry, the first step being a proper claim construction.210 The
second step of the infringement analysis involves the comparison of
the accused product or process to the properly construed claim.211
A patent holder alleging infringement has the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence at trial that the accused
infringer’s product or process contains every limitation of at least one
of the asserted claims of the patent, either literally or by
equivalence.212 Infringement is a question of fact that the Federal
Circuit reviews for substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict
or for clear error where the trial judge sits as the fact-finder.213
A literal infringement results when every exact limitation recited
in a patent claim is present in an accused product or process.214 A
finding of infringement does not, however, require that the accused
209. See 35 U.S.C § 271(a) (1994). For a statistical study of the Federal Circuit’s
dispositions in appeals from infringement findings, see Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical
Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151, at tbl. 5
(1995) (covering period from Oct. 1, 1982 to Mar. 15, 1994).
210. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(stating that “the claim must be properly construed to determine scope and meaning”) (citations
omitted).
211. Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
212. Conroy v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that [t]o
support an infringement determination, an accused device must embody exactly each claim
limitation or its equivalent); Key Mfg., Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (citing Julien v. Zerrigue, 864 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) (stating that the patentee
must prove that the accused device embodies every limitation in the claim, either literally or by
a substantial equivalent).
213. See Lemelson, 968 F.2d at 1207 (“[The substantial evidence test] requires us to decide
for ourselves whether reasonable jurors viewing the evidence as a whole could have found the
facts needed to support the verdict in light of the applicable law.”). See also United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”).
214. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1282
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 767 F.2d 1563, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1985)).
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product or process embody every limitation of the claim literally.215
Even when a patent holder cannot prove literal infringement, a
finding of infringement may be appropriate under the doctrine of
equivalents.216
In Regents of University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that Lilly did
not infringe the asserted patent claims either literally or under the
doctrine of equivalents.217 The patented technology involved
recombinant genetic constructs and microorganisms that express
human proinsulin.218 The Federal Circuit held that the proper
interpretation of the patent claims in this case must recognize the
effect of a disclaimer by the patent applicants during prosecution.219
The applicants surrendered coverage of human proinsulin
production using a fusion protein.220 The prior art cited by the patent
examiner taught the use of recombinant eukaryotic and prokaryotic
fusion proteins to produce a eukaryotic protein, including insulin, in a
bacterial host.221 The applicants amended their claims to distinguish
this prior art.222 This same action resulted in both a claim
interpretation that precluded a finding of literal infringement and a
prosecution history estoppel that precluded a finding of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.223
In its nonprecedential disposition in Evans Medical Ltd. v.
American Cyanamid Co.,224 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
215. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950).
216. Id.
217. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
218. Id. at 1562 (discussing U.S. Patent No. 4,431,740).
219. Id. at 1572-73 & n.6.
220. Id.
221. Regents of Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1572-73.
222. Id. at 1573.
223. Id. at 1573-74.
224. 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1455, 1455-56 (Fed. Cir. 1999). All dispositions of the Federal
Circuit are precedential unless otherwise noted. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(a). The holdings of a
precedential decision are binding on a subsequent panel unless overruled by the court en banc.
South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (stating
appropriateness of adopting body of law established by Court of Claims and Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals in Federal Circuit decisions); cf. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574,
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)) (“Where conflicting statements . . . appear in our precedent, the panel is obligated to
review the cases and reconcile or explain the statements, if possible. If not reconcilable and if
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court’s summary judgment of noninfringement.225 The patented
technology involved purified Bordetella pertussis antigen and its use
as a vaccine.226 The crux of the infringement analysis was the proper
construction of the claim term “purified.”227
The Federal Circuit noted that the claim term purified inherently
required a characterization of degree in order to be defined
precisely.228 The court acknowledged that no consensus had emerged
on the plain meaning of the term to one of ordinary skill in the art.229
Upon examination of the patent specification, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the claim term purified meant that the recited antigen
must comprise greater than fifty percent of the 69kD antigen.230
In view of the statement in the specification that the 69kD antigen
preparation contemplated as the invention for use in vaccines “may,
if desired, contain minor quantities of other antigenic compounds,”
the Federal Circuit reasoned that “other components” could not
comprise more than fifty percent of the contemplated 69kD antigenic
preparation as used in a vaccine.231 However, these statements did not
necessarily set a higher, upper bound on the degree of purity
required.232 In any event, because the parties did not dispute that the
accused antigen product contained no more than four percent of the
69kD antigen, the Federal Circuit concluded as a matter of law that
no infringement, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents,
not merely conflicting dicta, the panel is obligated to follow the earlier case law which is the
binding precedent.”). The assigned panel, however, may unanimously determine at the time of
issuance that an opinion would not significantly add to the law and therefore designate the
opinion or order as nonprecedential. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b). An opinion or order so designated
may not be employed or cited as precedent but may be relied upon for assertions of claim
preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, law of the case, or the like. Id. Furthermore, in
certain circumstances the Federal Circuit may affirm the judgment of a trial court or
administrative agency without opinion. FED. CIR. R. 36.
225. Id. at 1456 (table).
226. Id. at 1456-57 (identifying the patents-in-suit as U.S. Patents No. 5,237,052, No.
5,438,120, and No. 5,648,080).
227. Id. at 1459.
228. Id.
229. Evans Med. Ltd. v. American Cyanamid Co., 52 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1459.
230. Id. See also id. at 1457 & n.4 (describing the 69 kD antigen as an outer membrane B.
pertussis protein with a molecular weight of 69 kilodaltons, which was also known in the art as
P.69 and pertactin).
231. Id. at 1459.
232. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/6
212.doc 08/24/00
2000] Biotechnology and the Federal Circuit 195
could exist.233
Patent litigation regarding biotechnology inventions can also arise
in the context of interference proceedings before the PTO.234 The
losing party can appeal an adverse Board decision by filing either a
civil action in the federal district court, or a notice of appeal directly
to the Federal Circuit.235 Even if a party chooses the district court
route, the Federal Circuit is the exclusive appellate forum for any
appeal in such an action.236
In Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp. the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court’s summary judgment that Genentech’s claimed
invention was not within the scope of the interference count for
purposes of determining priority of invention.237 The PTO declared
an interference between two patent applications, one assigned to
Genentech and the other to Chiron.238 The sole count of the
interference related to a recombinant genetic construct containing
DNA encoding human insulin-like growth factor-I (hIGF-I) in proper
reading frame with Saccharomyces alpha-factor secretory leader and
processing signal sequence.239
The Genentech application claimed a DNA construct that, upon
insertion into a yeast expression plasmid and transformation into a
yeast cell, would facilitate secretion of a fusion protein, i.e., a
modified IGF-I consisting of a collagenase cleavage site at the
carboxy terminal of hIGF-I.240 The Board rejected Chiron’s argument
that this subject matter fell outside the scope of the interference
count.241 Nevertheless, the Board awarded priority of invention to
Chiron based on its determination that Genentech failed to prove any
practical, therapeutic utility of its fusion protein.242
233. Id. at 1460.
234. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1994).
235. Id. § 146.
236. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
237. 112 F.3d 495, 496-97 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
238. Id. at 497 (indicating the interference between U.S. patent applications Serial No.
06/506,078 and No. 06/922,199).
239. Id. (describing the interference count as reciting “[a] DNA construct comprising a
sequence coding for human insulin-like growth factor-I joined in proper reading frame with
Saccharomyces alpha-factor secretory leader and processing signal sequence”).
240. Id. at 497-98.
241. Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d at 498.
242. Id.
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Genentech appealed the Board’s decision by filing a civil action in
district court.243 Chiron filed a motion for summary judgment that
Genentech’s claimed invention of a DNA construct encoding
modified IGF-I was not within the scope of the interference count as
properly interpreted.244 The district court granted this motion and thus
affirmed the Board’s award of priority on different grounds.245
In so ruling, the district court interpreted the interference count’s
recitation of a DNA sequence coding for hIGF-I to mean that mature
IGF-I, or the specific seventy amino acid protein, must be ultimately
secreted from the transformed yeast cell containing the DNA
construct of the count.246 The district court also construed the count
term “comprising,” which typically allows additional elements to be
present as long as the named elements are present, to exclude
additional DNA between the alpha-factor processing sequences and
the hIGF-I sequence.247 Furthermore, the district court applied a
common dictionary definition of the count term “joined” instead of
one tailored to the biotechnical discipline.248
The Federal Circuit noted that the interference count specifically
defined a DNA construct, not the protein that is produced by
expression from the construct.249 The count specified that the recited
DNA construct included a DNA sequence coding for the secretory
leader, a processing signal sequence, and hIGF-I.250 No dispute
existed as to whether the Genentech DNA construct contained the
complete DNA sequences for these three proteins.251 The issue,
therefore, was whether the addition of nine codons encoding the
collagenase cleavage site inserted between the sequences coding for
hIGF-I and the alpha-factor processing sequences somehow removed
the Genentech DNA construct from the scope of the interference
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 498-99.
246. Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d at 499.
247. Id. at 499-500.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 501 (“Although a close relationship exists between a DNA construct and the
protein it encodes, the two are not equal.”).
250. Id.
251. Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d at 501.
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count.252 The Federal Circuit reasoned that this depended upon the
interpretation of the count phrase “joined in proper reading frame.”253
The Federal Circuit concluded that a proper construction of the
phrase “in proper reading frame” meant that the nucleotides must be
read in such a way that the seventy amino acids of hIGF-I are
incorporated in the proper sequence in the expressed protein.254 The
court thus ruled that the count did not exclude nucleotides coding for
additional amino acids at the beginning of the seventy amino acid
IGF-I sequence.255 The Federal Circuit further noted that such an
interpretation of the count was consistent with the open-ended term
comprising.256
In addition, the Federal Circuit determined that count term joined
did not foreclose the possibility of additional nucleotides being
inserted between the two joined elements, the alpha-factor processing
sequences and hIGF-I sequence.257 The Federal Circuit rejected that
district court’s interpretation of the count to require that the alpha-
factor processing sequences and hIGF-I sequence must be directly
joined with no intervening nucleotides.258 The Federal Circuit held
that when viewed properly through the broadest, reasonable
interpretation, the count did not necessitate a direct joining or
connection.259
CONCLUSION
A survey of the Federal Circuit decisions in biotechnology patent
cases reveals certain informative guidelines. First, because the
consideration of various standards for patentability and disclosure
centers on the level of skill in the art at the time of patent application
filing, the technical underpinnings of a Federal Circuit decision on
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d at 501 (“‘Comprising’ is a term of art used
in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may
be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.”).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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these matters should be viewed in the proper time frame.
Appreciation of this temporal distortion is particularly important
where the issue involves whether the patent disclosure of specific
species supports the scope of broad genus claims. This genus-species
relationship is inherently a moving target. As biotechnology matures,
an otherwise unpredictable art can become more predictable and thus
might permit increasingly broader claims based upon limited
examples.
Second, procedurally speaking, the Federal Circuit accomplishes
its appellate task by a closed review of the evidence presented by the
parties. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit’s conclusions might not
reflect the true state of the art from an objective perspective but
typically track the record developed in the trial court precisely. In this
regard the documentary evidence and witness testimony is as key in a
biotechnology patent case as in any other lawsuit. Indeed, the record
of the state of the art or the inventor’s own research activities, which
can be found in the patent application, its file history, and the cited
prior art, as well as any laboratory notebooks, research grant
materials or commercial information relating to the patented
technology, often form the factual focus of the case.
Finally, the decisions of the Federal Circuit in biotechnology
patent cases should be viewed with an eye towards the applicable
standards of review. The court remains faithful to the established
principles of deference to the factual findings of its lower tribunals on
certain issues. This practice can result in an appellate disposition that
rests less on an agreement with statements regarding the true state of
the technology and more on the approval of conclusions drawn from
evidentiary reflections of that technology.
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